Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses works together

Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses

06.12.2014-Meryem Rabia Tasbilek

            Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses works together. The state power creates different synthesis from them in different times. In my opinion, Repressive State Apparatus is the sub-tool of Ideological State apparatuses. Althusser argues that “I shall say rather that every state apparatus, whether repressive or ideological, ‘functions’ both by violence and by ideology, but with one very important distinction which makes it imperative not to confuse the Ideological State Apparatuses with Repressive State Apparatus.”[1] For him, the distinction was the massive and predominantly the use of violence by the Repressive State Apparatus. On the other hand, according to him ideology uses these tools secondarily. In the next several pages, I will create some synthesis about his argument and my observation about these two types of State Apparatuses and try to enrich my argument by more specific examples and arguments from Patricia Daley, Angela Davis, and Michel Foucault critiques.

            First of all, even though I find Althusser's argument very useful and intellectual, I need to confess that I had hard time to understand why he pays this much attention to separate these Apparatuses. At one point, I agree with him about the necessity of having more specific notions for each problems of the system. On the other hand, it seems like when we separate the Ideological State Apparatuses from the Repressive one, for some people this may create a misunderstanding and/or ignorance about the repression of the ideologies. I might be wrong about this, but are the ideologies and Ideological State Apparatuses really using the violence secondarily? In my opinion, their whole existences are pure violence, especially, because the ideologies and Ideological State Apparatuses do not leave any space for us to live outside of them. This is the highest level of violence against our existences. As Althusser argues, “there is no practice except by and in an ideology. There is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects.”[2] When we think that we gained some free spaces or had some freedom that was cut off from the system, it is only an alteration of the system and a new form of the current Ideological State Apparatus. It seems like the system, the State gives us a kind of hush money by altering the style of Repressive State Apparatuses. This “change” creates an illusion and makes us think that with this alteration Ideological State Apparatuses or the dominant ideology is also changed. The appearances of them seem less violence. I believe that this is similar with Foucault’s argument about new types of punishments and prison systems. Foucault emphasizes that “what they were attacking in traditional justice, before they set out the principles of a new penalty, was certainly the excessive nature of the punishments, but an excess that was bound up with an irregularity even more than with an abuse of the power to punish.”[3]

            Moreover, it seems like the relation between Repression and Ideology is circular. They reproduce each other and secure each other and more than that they make the existence and the stability of the State possible by their cooperation. It seems like another Althusser’s argument fits that place very well to support my argument about the nature and function of these two Apparatuses. Althusser argues that “the state, which is the state of the ruling class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary; it is the precondition for any distinction between public and private… It is unimportant whether it is institutions in which they are realized are public or private. What matters is how they function.”[4] In my opinion, it is same for different types of apparatuses, too, whether it is ideological or repressive the apparatuses, they are both violent. However, we may make a kind of reverse statement about the apparatuses by saying that they are pre and after conditions for the system, for the dominant ideology. The state needs them to exist and continue to exist. I think, Althusser’s this statement also support my argument: “To my knowledge, no class can hold state power a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the Ideological State Apparatus.”[5] And he continues, “Ruling ideology that ensures a ‘harmony’ between the Repressive State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses and between the different Ideological State Apparatus.”[6] We may link this argument with Delay’s argument that emphasizes “the language of genocide is used instrumentally by each ethnic group and by different parties. Genocidal violence became further institutionalized with the realization by military officers and politicians that it could be used to gain political advantage without international sanctions.”[7] It is clear that in this example, we become witness the collective work of Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses and how the dominant groups in the society manipulates them based on new social conditions.

            If I link these arguments with the prison industry complex and Davis’ arguments, first of all I think we need to talk about the impact of Ideological State Apparatuses such as school; media etc. which make people accept and internalize the practices of Repressive State Apparatuses, especially in the prisons and about the prisons and prisoners. As Althusser mentions that “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence,” [8] Davis also argues that “the prison is present in our lives and, at the same time, it is absent from our lives.”[9] The state and the dominant power make us to believe that we are aware of the conditions and the function of the prison system and also other types of repressive state apparatuses. Of course, this is an illusion! To fulfill this goal, the state uses countless types of apparatuses from ideological and repressive types. In my opinion, if we stick with Althusser's dualistic argument, the system uses ideological state apparatuses more, because it is more useful to hide the real motivations behind it. Also, it is everywhere in the society like air.

            When the state masses its hands, it gets more aggressive and uses more visual and physical violence. The extreme use of repressive state apparatuses does not mean to stop using the ideological apparatuses. Foucault supports my argument by saying that “one has only to point out so many precautions to realize that capital punishment remains fundamentally, even today, a spectacle that must actually by forbidden.”[10] In my opinion, we can link the fake progress and the switch between ideological and repression types of the state apparatus by the help of Foucault’s another argument: “Crime became less violent long before punishment became less severe.”[11] Also, similarly Davis argues that “the long-running HBO program Oz has managed to persuade many viewers that they know exactly what goes on in male maximum-security prisons.”[12] For these types of people, Ideological State Apparatuses are enough. However, if they do not internalize these delusional realities and decide to riot for change or abolish the prison than the Repressive State Apparatuses are ready for them. Probably, in the society even people who experience particular types of repression from the system can rationalize his or her violent experiences especially by the force of ideological state apparatuses. For instance, Davis mentions that “people wanted to believe that prisons would not only reduce crime, they would also provide jobs and stimulate economic development in out-of-the-way places.”[13] The Ideological State Apparatuses makes people rationalize the violence of the Repressive State Apparatuses even in the prisons. As Althusser argues, “the essential point is that on condition that we interpret the imaginary transposition and inversion of ideology we arrive at the conclusion that in ideology ‘men represent their real conditions of existence to themselves in an imaginary form.”[14] For the same reason, I believe that we have hard time to improve our imaginary to produce new and different types of resistance. As Davis suggests, we need to get rid of the dualistic solutions against the current system. Our minds have been forced to see the situation as prison industry complex or society with full of criminals. We need to break the rigid cycle of the systematic oppression of the state and its various apparatus. She emphasizes this clearly by saying that “the first step, then, would be to let go of the desire to discover one single alternative system of punishment that would occupy the same footprint as the prison system.”[15]

            Ultimately, if we link all of these arguments and try to produce something against the collective oppression of Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses, in my opinion we may receive some intellectual help from Lugones. The way ideology reach every point of our lives and society, it seems like the resistance and critique of it should cover all sides of our lives and society, too, if we really want to create some changes. As she argues “this is clear when we understand that resistant sense cannot reside in “the individual” as the institutional backing that makes possible the appearance of individuality, is absent.”[16] It is clear that either Repression or Ideology of the state is not individual. For this reason, our resistance should be the same way to reach some meaningful and effective solutions. As Foucault emphasizes “the public execution is to be understood not only as a judicial, but also as a political ritual. It belongs, even in minor cases, to the ceremonies by which the power is manifested.”[17] People who resist against this dominant power and its various apparatuses, we need to find our own authentic and collective manifestations.

[1] Althusser, Louis. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. Appendix 2. Trans. Ben Brewster. Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971. Pg. 303.
[2] Althusser. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” Pg. 323.
[3] Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books, 1979. Pg. 78.
[4] Althusser. IISSA. Pg. 302, 303.
[5] Althusser. IISSA. Pg. 304.
[6] Althusser. IISSA. Pg. 306.
[7] Delay, Patricia. “The Masculinized Stat and the History of Genocide.” Pg. 77.
[8] Althusser. IISSA. Pg. 317.
[9] Davis, Y. Angela. Are Prisons Absolute? New York: Seven Stories Press. 2003. Pg. 15.
[10] Foucault. Discipline and Punish. Pg. 15.
[11] Foucault. DP. Pg. 76.
[12] Davis. Are Prisons Absolute? Pg. 18.
[13] Davis. APA? Pg. 15.
[14] Althusser. IISSA. Pg. 318.
[15] Davis. APA? Pg. 106.
[16] Lugones, Maria. Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2003. Pg. 218.
[17] Foucault. DP. Pg. 47.

Philosophical Hangouts!

Lugones frames the strategic occupation against the institutional, structural violence as “hanging out.” She writes, “I am looking for a spatiality that does not mystify territorial enclosures and purities of peoples, languages, traditions. As I think of such conditions, I am proposing the spatial practice of hanging out because it is a practice that is in transgression of territorial enclosures.” (Lugones, 220) In my opinion, we need to transgress the territorial enclosures not only by breaking the forced borders of the social structures physically, but also intellectually.

First, if we need to talk about physical challenges for a purpose as a philosophic and strategic movement, Lugones suggest hanging out as an option. By this way, we may also challenge “the given dichotomy.” (Lugones, 207) She claims that if we become street walkers as a part of tactical strategies to challenge oppressions, we may manage “to learn, to listen, to transmit information, to participate in communicative creations of intentionality, to gains social depth.” (Lugones, 209) According to her, being a streetwalker for this specific purpose, “theorizing understands and moves resistance to intermeshed oppressions.” (Lugones, 210) It seems like with a strategic motivation, hanging out action has a mutation and became an active resistance and philosophical movement. We may even say that by becoming a streetwalker for the purpose of “transgression of territorial enclosures” can save us from having Sartre’s famous arguments of bad faith. As Lugones claims, “Hanging out opens attention to transmutations of sense, borders of meaning, without the enclosures and exclusions that have characterized a politics of sameness… The occupation of space is defined by movement in and between hangouts where resistant sense was/is made in practice by active subjects.” (Lugones, 220) It sounds almost like a civil disobedience, but I do not want to label it by this way to not put limitations on its wider meanings and functions.

Moreover, if we link Lugones arguments with Davis, it is better to mention one more argument from her. At the end of the Streetwalker section, she argues that “The street walker theorist walks in illegitimate refusal to legitimate oppressive arrangements and logics. In tense negotiations, she is watchful of opportunities taken up in the devious interventions of the oppressed.” (Lugones, 221) I argue that we need to do these strategic hangouts intellectually, too. We need to be streetwalkers in the land of philosophy, sociology and history. Lugones’ this hangout argument reminded me one of the critiques of Davis about the lack of alternatives and lack of philosophical, sociological imagination for prison industry complex. She claims, “Ironically, even the anti-death penalty campaign tends to rely on the assumption that life imprisonment is the most rational alternative to capital punishment.” (Davis, 106) She criticized the dichotomy behind this mentality. She continues her argument by mentioning, “The first step then would be to let go of the desire to discover one single alternative system to punishment that would occupy the same footprint as the prison system.” (Davis, 106) It is possible to link this ironic position of the anti-death penalty campaign supporters and Davis’ critiques about problem of not being able to produce new options against prison with Lugones’ hangouts option. The intellectuals need to do more philosophical hangouts and (metaphorical) street walks to produce new options to break the either/or cycle in this violent system. If we can produce more intellectual streetwalkers in our society, we can produce more options to abolish prison and other forced fences.

actions and resistance at both places

Benjamin argues, “Today organized labour is, and apart from the state probably the only legal subject entitled to exercise violence.” (Benjamin, 239) As Walter Benjamin claims that violence cannot be practiced individually, all violence is structural and institutional. For the same reason, we may say that all resistance needs to contain some type of collective acts. Similarly, Lugones argues our “life is spatially mapped by power.” (Lugones, 8) It seems like to break down the asymmetric power relations between oppressors and oppressed, we need to act collectively, too. Even though sometimes the system uses the puppet leaders to make us blame and responsible for the oppression, the legitimate power and institutional violence are not practiced individually. Lugones continues her argument by saying “There is no “you” there except a person spatially and thus relationally conceived through your functionality in terms of power.” (Lugones, 9) It seems like we internalize the concept of individualism even as being oppressed. For people who live in the society and affected by the ideologies together, in the prison of Ideological State Apparatuses, the illusion of individual mind and act are a kind of abstraction of our existence and power. I reach to this conclusion by the help of these authors, but at the same time, one side of my mind still resists to keep the possibility of my own individual and intellectual authenticity.

At some point, even though as a person who prefer to think and act against the system individually without being an individualistic, I agree with Lugones. To shake the system from its roots, we need to accept that the society do not think and act individually, because all of our worlds are shaped by ideologies and there is not safe zone that we can escape from ideologies in our lives. I am struggling between the ideas of individual standpoints and collective resistance, but probably to avoid being a docile body and eliminate the conditions of having bad faith, we always need to come and go between individual and collective positions to not take one side for granted. By this dynamic existence, we may keep both positions of our existence fresh. As Lugones argues: “Noticing the tension from within logic of resistance enables one to acquire a multiple sensing, a multiple perceiving, and a multiple sociality.” (Lugones, 11) In other places, she claims that “When resistance is reduced to reaction, it is understood in the physical model and thus as contained in action. But resistance is not reaction but response-thoughtful, often complex, devious, insightful response, insightful into the very intricacies of the structure of what is being resisted.” (Lugones, 29) In my opinion, to get rid of the problem of reaction we may use my suggestion of negotiation of our existence between individual and collective positions. Both of these positions can be trigger for reactions to the social situations and if we balance our existence between both of the situations, each of them can be an antidote against reducing our resistance to reaction.

Sometimes, acting and rioting with a group or society as a subgroup of oppressed people can only produce reactions to the oppression. On the other hand, individual answers to the problem of collective, institutional repressions can be limited as only reactions, too. For these reasons, I argue that mediation of individual and collective acts can be our solution to produce more powerful resistance against systemic oppression.  It is hard to convince the reader to this argument, but as Althusser argues: “The essential point is that on condition that we interpret the imaginary transposition and inversion of ideology we arrive at the conclusion that in the ideology men represent their real conditions of existence to themselves in an imaginary form.” (Althusser, 318) In my opinion, these imaginary forms are neither only individual nor only collective forms. For this reason, switching our situations and producing actions and resistance at both places are necessary.

God and Abraham as Noble Moralists

2014
Meryem Rabia Tasbilek

For the first time, when I read Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil’s section about the “noble man” and the distinction between noble and herd/base morality, he made me think about God as a noble moralist. The description of the noble people and their morality seemed to me similar with most of the God specialties in many religions. I started to think about how I can link this prototype with Abraham’s God who creates some base morality for common people and then ask from Abraham to sacrifice his son. Then I continued to place Kierkegaard’s Abraham on Nietzsche's dialectic morality. Where could I locate him and his God on this moral scale? If the God is the biggest noble morality, how can he help us to go beyond good and evil? Can he? These are my first trigger questions that I produced even spontaneously when I re-read the “What is noble?” section for this assignment. In this paper, I will try to answers these questions by the help of Kierkegaard’s and Nietzsche’s arguments. I will try to link Abraham’s and indirectly Kierkegaard’s god with Nietzsche's noble man argument.

            In the Fear and Trembling, Abraham’s god asked from him to sacrifice his son and as a part of his spiritual test, he has to not only sacrifice his son Isaac, but also fully desire to do it and paradoxically by the result of his faith, he has to believe that he would not be deprived from him. These requirements make us to question the profile of Abraham’s god. Such as: Who is he? He commanded not to kill for countless centuries with various prophets and then creates different moralities and have expectations from different types of people and social groups such as Abraham. For common people he stays at a distance like a noble person, but when he find or choose some noble people from that society, suddenly it seems like he alters his expectations and invite some of them to switch their morality from base to noble. Nietzsche supports my argument by saying: “...great things are left for the great, abysses for the profound, delicacy and trembling for the subtle, and, all in all, everything rare for those who are rare themselves”.[1] I think; Abraham’s god is agree with Nietzsche at some point when he creates different levels of tests for different types of people.

Moreover, Nietzsche argues that “...egoism belongs to essence of the noble soul”.[2] Based on this description, we surely can link this specialty with Abraham’s god. His god is able to know everything, but still test him and ask him to sacrifice his son. Theologians argue that this test is not for the god, but for the person especially who is chosen by the god. We may also say that the sacrifice test is the sour fruit of the paradoxical nature of the faith. But, still it is very egoistic. Nietzsche argues that “People used to make human sacrifice to their god, perhaps even sacrificing those they loved the best...”[3]  These practices and godly request are not a new thing. For some people, this sacrificial test is not enough, so to reach a higher noble point, they even sacrifice their gods as Nietzsche argues that “Didn’t people have to sacrifice God himself and worship rocks, stupidity, gravity, fate, or nothingness out of sheer cruelty to themselves? To sacrifice God for nothingness.”[4] At that point, maybe their ego became higher, more powerful than their gods. They decide to create their own nobleness. I wonder if Abraham’s position in this argument. If he could refuse to sacrifice Isaac, could he be nobler by losing his faith or this refinement could make him to be a part of the base morality and eliminate all of his differences from the herd. I think, his position could be very similar with the devil. His refinement would not equalize him with the base, because his refutation would make him disobedient in front of the god. It would be different types of noble answer to God’s test. Ironically, on the other hand, by attempting to sacrifice his son, he became a different type of disobedient against the herd morality. If Abraham was refused to do sacrifice by reminding the previous moral rules to his God, it would be telling to the god, do not be paradoxical and this could be very sarcastic. But instead of mentioning the paradox to the god, he accepted and practiced the requirement of the paradox,[5] his faith and because of this for the base he is valuable, he is a prophet. On the one hand, Abraham could have refused his God’s command by emphasizing his egoism and tried to be noble by his own way in front of the god. Both ways, the result would be different than the base practices. Even if he sacrificed his son, because of his nobleness, his religious status could make his action different than others, but by this way his story would lose its power of being a paradoxical example. As Nietzsche argues: “It is obvious that moral expressions everywhere were first applied to people and then, only later and derivatively, to actions…”[6]

Since Abraham had enough strength to experience this type of test, more than his different choices, his experiences by being tested made him extremely separated from the herd. Nietzsche support my argument by mentioning that “...the trembling certainty that sutures and colors him entirely, a certainty that his suffering have given him a greater knowledge than the cleverest and wisest can have, that he knows his way around and was once at home” in many distant and terrifying words that “you do know anything about!”... Profound suffering makes you noble; it separates”.[7] I think, because of this, we can include Abraham and the Devil to the noble group together. Even though their experiences and tests were different, because they were both experienced the trembling in front of God, I think they meet at one point. In my opinion, all of these differences are masks to tell similar stories to different types of characters in the world. Noble people are different from each other’s, so their sources to shape their minds could be different tastes. I can invite Nietzsche again to support me in this argument: “Every philosophy conceals a philosophy too: every opinion is also a hiding place, every word is also a mask”.[8]

If I come back to my argument about God as an prototype of the noble man and the producer of morality, “...base person attributes to himself is the one his masters have attributed to him (creating value is the true right of masters).[9] Base people’s reactions to the noble humans are very similar with their relations to the god/s. As Nietzsche crates the frame for slave morality: “Slave morality is essentially a morality of utility. Here we have the point of origin for that famous opposition between “good” and “evil.”...According to the slave morality then, “evil” inspires and wants to inspire fear, while the “bad” man is seen as contemptible”.[10] The people, who worship a god, have similar specialties. For them like the d/evil, god is fearful, too. They inspire both, but cannot pass the other side of the fence. However, the noble people can manage to do that and test back the god’s limitations and if the god is a type of a noble, this try would not hurt them. I think we can link Nietzsche's base and noble comparison with Kierkegaard’s hero argument, too. He mentioned that “The difference between the tragic hero and Abraham is very obvious. The tragic hero is still within the ethical… Abraham’s situation is different. By his act he transgressed the ethical altogether…”[11] Based on this argument, it is clear that the hero is still a part of the herd/base because he does not produce his own norms, but try to practice the base morality extremely to gain the heroic label. Abraham on the other hand, experiences some ebb and tide, but mostly stays in the frame of noble with his God by his attempt of the sacrifice.

Nietzsche argues that “The noble type of person feels that he determines value, he does not need anyone’s approval, he judges that “what is harmful to me is harmful in itself.” he knows that he is the one who gives honor things in the first place, he creates values.”[12] It seems like this profile matches very well the definition of many gods, especially the god of Abraham. He also argued that slave and master’s morality can exist in the same person’s soul together. Maybe Abraham is a nice example of this. In the society, he seems like he belonged to the noble group, but in front of the God that he worship, he was trying to negotiate his noble position to make it stable by being a kind of base in front of the noblest one, the God.

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[1] Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. J. Norman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pg. 49.

[2] Nietzsche. Beyond Good and Evil. Pg. 162.

[3] Nietzsche. BGE. Pg. 50.

[4] Nietzsche. BGE. Pg. 50.

[5] Kierkegaard, Soren. Fear and Trembling. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1983. Pg. 70.

[6] Nietzsche. BGE. Pg. 154.

[7] Nietzsche. BGE. Pg. 166.

[8] Nietzsche. BGE. Pg. 173.

[9] Nietzsche. BGE. Pg. 157.

[10] Nietzsche. BGE. Pg. 156.

[11] Kierkegaard, Soren. Fear and Trembling. Pg. 59.

[12] Nietzsche. BGE. Pg. 154.

Invisible Man

Relationship between The Prince, Leviathan and Invisible Man

Meryem Rabia Tasbilek

In this paper, I will share some quotes from Machiavelli’s The Prince and Hobbes’ Leviathan to compare, contrast and analyze their perspectives about leadership. However, because I believe that Machiavelli’s arguments are more related with Ellison’s Dr. Bledsoe character, I will use more sources from The Prince. I will also try to add my personal position about their preferences about ruling. I will compare these two leadership meditations with Ellison’s Dr. Bledsoe character in Invisible Man as a ruler. The reader will find more specific explanation about these specific topics in the next several pages. In addition, the paper will cover some explanations why we need both theorists to understand leadership.

First of all, I believe that it is always better to have more comparative and informative sources to understand political issues and notions. For this reason, Machiavelli’s The Prince and Hobbes’ Leviathan are very useful foundations for us to understand leadership. In my opinion, we are able to learn more about a ruler especially the Monarchic ones in The Prince’s than Leviathan. On the other hand, even though Hobbes includes the rulers to his audience, it seems like his main concerns is the ruled people and the nature and obligations of people in the society, because his main concern is creating a society rather than creating a manual for a ruler. Moreover, both of them have similar emphasizes about the importance of knowing himself and others for the ruler to understand and govern the people. For instance Machiavelli mentions that “for the same way that landscape painters station themselves in the valleys in order to get a good view of the plains, so it is necessary to be a prince to know thoroughly the nature of the people, and one of the populace to know the nature of the prince” (4). Similar to Machiavelli, Hobbes also argues that “He that is to govern to whole Nation, must read in himself, not this, or that particular man; but Man-kind: which though it be hard to do, harder than to learn any Language, or Science” (83). It is interesting to see that even for different motivations, the solution to create a “good” ruler for Machiavelli or a peaceful society for Hobbes are all related with  “read thy self.”

In addition, Machiavelli categorizes all mankind dominations either as republics or monarchies. In The Prince, he only deals with Monarchies (5). Machiavelli’s ideal prince is so pragmatist and cannot and should not trust anyone: “You find enemies in all those whom you have injured by occupying that domination, and you cannot maintain the friendship of those who have helped you to obtain this possession, as you will not be able to fulfill their expectations” (6). I think this part is a good fit for Dr. Bledsoe’s perspective about his social environment. For him, everybody is a potential enemy and to keep his powerful position stable, he never let someone to be his real friend. It seems that he keep a distance with people (143). On the other hand, Hobbes argues that:

If any man desires the same thing, which never the less they cannot both enjoy, they become enemies; and in the way to their End, endeavor to destroy, or subdue one another… If one plant, sow, build, or possess a convenient Seat, others may probably be expected to come prepared with forces united to dispossess, and deprive him, not only of the fruit of his labor, but also of his life or liberty. (Leviathan 184)

Both of the authors have similar suggestions and beliefs about not trusting the others to keep the power stable. Only, Hobbes emphasizes that this condition is a product of equality and the human kind’s passion about competition poisons peaceful society (38). When the protagonist, the invisible man, talks with anger and tells Dr. Bledsoe that he will go to Mr. Norton and made a complain about him, because of the nature of Dr. Bledsoe’s ruling mentality and to keep the custom of the college rigid he decided to exile the protagonist. In my opinion, Dr. Bledsoe’s fake recommendation letters and his behaviors against the protagonist is a good match with Machiavelli’s advices. For instance, Machiavelli suggests that “for it must be noted, the men must either be caressed or else annihilated; They will revenge themselves for small injuries, but cannot do so for great ones; the injury therefore that we do to a man must be such that we need not fear his vengeance” (9). I believe that these statements are extremely perfect explanations of Dr. Bledsoe’s “malicious” letters’ motivation and unexpectable content. We may see these letters as evil, but for Machiavelli, they function very well and are necessary. Dr. Bledsoe could simply deport the protagonist, but he did not find this injury enough and decided to write the uniquely weird and evil letters to several people and he did not sent these letters by himself, he made the protagonist carry them to destroy his own hope unconsciously.

Truly, Dr. Bledsoe followed Machiavelli’s theoretical advices probably as a result of his leadership instinct. For instance, in The Prince Machiavelli says that same as the hectic fevers, the opponents people “at their beginning are easy to cure, but difficult to recognize, but in course of time when they have not at the first recognized and threatened, become easy to recognize and difficult to cure” (11). For some of us, Dr. Bledsoe’s decisions against the protagonist may seem extreme, but based on the Machiavelli’s leadership meditations, he is a perfect example. Not only Machiavelli, but also Hobbes has similar suggestions in Leviathan: “Therefore before names of Just and Unjust can have place, there must be some coercive Power, to compel men equally to performance of their Covenants, by the terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they expect by the breach of their Covenant” (202). By this way, the benefit of the general group and their Covenant can be safe. We are able to see the protagonist’s acceptance and obey for Dr. Bledsoe’ practices, for the same reason, too. He says that “somehow, I convinced myself; I had violated the code and thus would have to submit to punishment” (Invisible Man 147). It is possible to read this statement related with Hobbes’ Covenant notion.

            In addition, Machiavelli was arguing in The Prince that “Whoever becomes the ruler of a free city and does not destroy it, can expect to be destroyed by it.” This cruel, pragmatist and paranoiac perspective can be seen Dr. Bledsoe’s reactions against the protagonist. Dr. Bledsoe was saying that “I’ve made my place in it and I’ll have every Negro in the country hanging on tree limbs by morning if it means staying where I am” (Invisible Man 143). By using these statements, this seems that he sees every men even his own races as potential enemies against his position. That is why the protagonist’ behavior was a threat for Dr. Bledsoe. It is better to remember Leviathan here: “Every man is Enemy to every man; the same is conquest to the time, wherein men live without other security, than what their own strength, and their own invention shall furnish them withal…” (186). Hobbes was talking about War here, but it seems like we can adjust all of his statement for the social competition and power conflicts, too.

Moreover, in Invisible Man, Dr. Bledsoe adds that “I do not even insist that it was worth it, but now I am here and I mean to stay-after you win the game, you take the prize and you keep it, protect it; there’s nothing else to do” (143). All of these samples from Dr. Bledsoe’s mentality is a perfect match with Machiavelli’s leadership model, do everything to keep your position and power, do it even cruelly, but not always openly, do it cleverly he advises. By practicing all these advices wisely, is equal to Machiavelli’s virtû as virtuosity notion that means a skill to handle. Machiavelli also suggests that even though “there are two ways of becoming prince which cannot be attributed entirely either to fortune or to ability” (31), he argues that “a prince must live with his subjects in such a way that no accident of good or evil fortune can deflect him from his course” (35). This seems like Dr. Bledsoe’s motivation of his cruelty on the protagonist. He could not put his position at any risk. In addition, Hobbes talks about similar things to eliminate the other powers by using power to secure himself, but in Leviathan it seems more general determination about the mankind rather than Machiavelli’s specific evaluations and suggestions about the rulers. Hobbes mentions that:

And from difference of one another, there is no way for any man to secure himself, so reasonable, as Anticipation; that is by force, or wiles, to master the persons of all men he can, so long, till he see no other power great enough to endanger him… And by consequence, such augmentation of domination over men, being necessary to a man’s conservation; it ought to be allowed him. (184-185)

In this part, Hobbes rationalizes the oppression and control over men to gain the security of the society. This might be a good interpretation of Dr. Bledsoe’s practices and his unmerciful statements while he was talking with the protagonist. For both of them, the main goal is the good of general structure and people rather than individuals. To fulfill this goal, some people can be sacrificed by a ruler. For instance, Hobbes equalizes the notion cruelty with power of the secure as individual practices (126), but when it is practices for the good of the society it is different. It is possible to see similar practices and suggestions in The Prince: “He must, however, take care not to misuse this mercifulness, Cesare Borgia was considered cruel, but his cruelty had brought order to Romagna, united it… A prince, therefore, must not mind incurring the charge of cruelty for the purpose of keeping his subjects united…” (60). Machiavelli also concludes that “with regard to being feared and loved, that men love at their own free will, but fear at the will of the prince, and that a wise prince must rely on what is in his power and not on what is in the power of others, and he must only contrive to avoid incurring hatred” (63). I believe one of the reason that Dr. Bledsoe left a pretended open door for the protagonist for returning and letters for infinite, useless hope was this motivation of avoiding the hatred for himself and make him weaker in the future with this hope.

Moreover, Machiavelli’s pragmatist ruler profile is also a good match with Dr. Bledsoe and the protagonist’s understandable surprise after he came across with Dr. Bledsoe’s behavioral switch: 

It is not, therefore, necessary for a prince to have all the above-named qualities, but it is very necessary to seem to have them… Thus it is well to seem merciful, faithful, humane, sincere, religious, and also to be so; but you must have the mind so disposed that when it is needful to be otherwise you may be able to change to opposite qualities.” (The Prince 65)

 Because, in the students’ mind, Dr. Bledsoe was an ideal model, but he was able to call “N” word to another African American person when he took of his formal mask. He went even further and said that “Your arms are too short to box with me, son. And I haven’t had to really clip a young Negro in years… They haven’t been as cocky as they used to” (144). This is a cold blood, inhumane statement, but in his masked profile he is not the same person who can use these kinds of language. In addition, to be more strong in his position, he seems like he internalized the dominant power’ language pattern and labels. He is good at virtû as virtuosity in his formal position. He was praying during the service deeply, but on the other hand his reaction is extremely different than a person who has been doing all those prayers and gave those lectures. In addition, his behavior is a good translation of The Prince’s “and they do not know how to live in freedom, so that they are slower to take arms, and a prince can win them over with the greater facility and establish himself securely,” statement (19). Dr. Bledsoe was aware of his power and the protagonist's weakness when the protagonists threaten him to complain about him to Mr. Norton. For this reason, he became crueler.

Dr. Bledsoe emphasizes that:

Negroes, don’t control this school or much of anything else, haven’t you learned even that?.. I control it… The only ones I pretend to please are big white fold, and even those I control more than they control me. This is a power set-up, son, and I am at the controls. You think about that. When you buck against me, you’re bucking against poor, rich white folk’s power, the nation’s power-which means government power! (Machiavelli 142)

From the protagonist's perspective Dr. Bledsoe's behavioral switch was unexpectable. We are able to see this in his statements like: “Just inside the building I got another shock. As we approached a mirror Dr. Bledsoe stopped and composed his angry face like a sculptor, making it a bland mask, leaving only the sparkle of his eyes to betray the emotion that I had seen only a moment before” (102). Being able to see this without watching or expecting to see it must be very chockfull, but the protagonist has his own virtû as virtuosity to survive such as rationalizing the situation. In addition, in Leviathan we learned that:

In the nature of man, we find three principal causes of quarrel. First, Competition; Secondly, Difference; Thirdly, Glory. The first, market men invade for Gain; the second for Safety; and the third, for reputation. The first use Violence, to make themselves masters of other men’s persons, wives, children, and cattle; the second, to defend them; the third, for trifles, as a word, a smile, a different opinion, and any other signs of undervalue, either direct in their Persons, or by reflection in their Kindred, their Friends, their Nation, their Profession, or their Name. (Machiavelli 185)

We are able to see all of these causes in Dr. Bledsoe's quarrel.

In addition, in The Prince, we learned that Machiavelli was suggesting arming the citizens. He was arguing that “for by arming them these arms become your own.” I thought, Dr. Bledsoe could forgive the protagonists to practice this method, but I guess he did this part for the rest of the school by creating a surface for them to study in his College. He followed the white men’s practices by giving a space for him to rule and not giving the same opportunity to all Africans. I believe that this is equal with the next Machiavelli argument: “And since all the subjects cannot be armed (in this case this can be education and power), when you give the privilege of arms to some, you can deal more safely with the others” (77). I was always surprised to see some minorities and especially African Americans in the history who could reach quite good positions during the heaviest racist atmospheres. I do not want to hide or ignore these people’s struggles and passion to reach their positions, but most of the time I understand this as a white policy to control rest of the oppressed minority population. In different conditions, arming some of the subjects to control the rest can be various ways. This can be education or some political position; it does not need to be only traditional arming. It is a tool for assimilation and also a useful way to create tokenistic fallacies in the society. Creating imbalanced power inside the group of the minorities creates advantages for the rulers and alienations for the advantaged ones from their groups. Dr. Bledsoe is a perfect example for this especially when he called the protagonist “Nigger.”

Moreover, in Machiavelli argues that:

It is also very profitable for a prince to give some outstanding example of his greatness in the internal administration… When it happens that someone does something extraordinary, either good or evil, in civil life, he must find such means of rewarding or punishing him which will be much talked about. And above all a prince must endeavor in every action to obtain fame for being great and excellent. (Machiavelli 82)

 I believe that this mentality is the main reason of Dr. Bledsoe’s cruel, extreme behaviors against the protagonist. Dr. Bledsoe is a great sample of a ruler whose character is shaped by Machiavelli's arguments that he mentions in The Prince. I am not sure if he is aware of this or not, but it is amazingly clear. As a reader we may think that Dr. Bledsoe could domesticate the protagonist inside the college during his education, but he saw a stronger potential on him compared to the other regular students and rule challengers. For this reason, he did not want to leave any fortune to the protagonists to create a possible future opposition potential in his “own” environment. Also, by letting Mr. Norton to see the slum part of the area, according to Dr. Bledsoe, the protagonist violated the unwritten covenant as I mentioned before, so he must be punished to benefit the other covenant followers, the college and to keep the covenant, the rule of the college stable and rigid. It is better to remember Hobbes’ argument about this kind of situation: “When a covenant is made, then to break it is Unjust: And the definition of Injustice, is no other than the not Performance of Covenant. And whatsoever is not Unjust is Just” (202). For this reason, according to Hobbes, Dr. Bledsoe’s decision about the protagonist is not the matter of injustice, but the protagonist’s irresponsible behaviors about Mr. Norton is unjust. To practice the just, Dr. Bledsoe needs to punish the protagonist.

Moreover, we may also mention The Prince’s fortune argument. Machiavelli was arguing that “the prince who bases himself entirely on fortune is ruined when fortune changes. I also believe that he is happy whose mode of procedure accords with the needs of the times, and similarly he is unfortunate whose mode of procedure is opposed to the times” (92). It is clear that in Dr. Bledsoe’ decisions and plans against the protagonist are very similar with this mentality. Dr. Bledsoe did not want to have any gap in his power and campus system. He does not want to leave his future to any fortune. He also tries to not leave any chances for the protagonist in New York by writing these hateful and unethical “recommendation” letters. He was very systematic to fulfill his plan. He was following a similar path with Machiavelli’s argument such as: “whoever is the cause of another becoming powerful is ruined himself; for that power is produced by him either through craft of force; and both of these are suspected by the one who has been raised to power” (14). Because, he did not want to ruin himself, his position and the order of the collage, he did whatever he can.

Ultimately, Machiavelli’s The Prince and Hobbes’ Leviathan have similar and different arguments for their perspectives about leadership. In addition, I believe it is better to have both theorists to understand leadership deeper. Machiavelli and Hobbes can give us a lot of hint about the rulers’ practices and their reasoning patters. If we are aware of the rulers’ mentality and how they implement their goals to keep the power in their hands, as a society we may create more balanced relationships with them. Both of them light the way for different parts of leadership and the obligation of the society. Hobbes is more focus on different parts of the society and their obligations rather than creating some tactics for a single ruler in Leviathan. His model is more collective than Machiavelli’s model and his audience are various than the target of The Prince. Machiavelli’s the main concern was keeping the power in the same hand by the help of all politic tools. However, it was interesting to see the similarities in the quotes that I chose from both theorists. In this paper, I tried to compare, contrast and analyze them with the support of some useful quotes and create some relations between these two writers’ claims with Ellison’s Dr. Bledsoe character in Invisible Man. I also tried to add my personal position about their preferences about their ruling preferences with my commentaries.

Works Cited

Ellison, Ralph. Invisible Man. New York: Vintage International, Random House. 1980.

Hobbes, Thomas. Leviathan. New York: Penguin Group, Penguin Classics. 1985.

Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. New York: The Modern Library, Random House. 1950.