Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses works together

Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses

06.12.2014-Meryem Rabia Tasbilek

            Ideological and Repressive State Apparatuses works together. The state power creates different synthesis from them in different times. In my opinion, Repressive State Apparatus is the sub-tool of Ideological State apparatuses. Althusser argues that “I shall say rather that every state apparatus, whether repressive or ideological, ‘functions’ both by violence and by ideology, but with one very important distinction which makes it imperative not to confuse the Ideological State Apparatuses with Repressive State Apparatus.”[1] For him, the distinction was the massive and predominantly the use of violence by the Repressive State Apparatus. On the other hand, according to him ideology uses these tools secondarily. In the next several pages, I will create some synthesis about his argument and my observation about these two types of State Apparatuses and try to enrich my argument by more specific examples and arguments from Patricia Daley, Angela Davis, and Michel Foucault critiques.

            First of all, even though I find Althusser's argument very useful and intellectual, I need to confess that I had hard time to understand why he pays this much attention to separate these Apparatuses. At one point, I agree with him about the necessity of having more specific notions for each problems of the system. On the other hand, it seems like when we separate the Ideological State Apparatuses from the Repressive one, for some people this may create a misunderstanding and/or ignorance about the repression of the ideologies. I might be wrong about this, but are the ideologies and Ideological State Apparatuses really using the violence secondarily? In my opinion, their whole existences are pure violence, especially, because the ideologies and Ideological State Apparatuses do not leave any space for us to live outside of them. This is the highest level of violence against our existences. As Althusser argues, “there is no practice except by and in an ideology. There is no ideology except by the subject and for subjects.”[2] When we think that we gained some free spaces or had some freedom that was cut off from the system, it is only an alteration of the system and a new form of the current Ideological State Apparatus. It seems like the system, the State gives us a kind of hush money by altering the style of Repressive State Apparatuses. This “change” creates an illusion and makes us think that with this alteration Ideological State Apparatuses or the dominant ideology is also changed. The appearances of them seem less violence. I believe that this is similar with Foucault’s argument about new types of punishments and prison systems. Foucault emphasizes that “what they were attacking in traditional justice, before they set out the principles of a new penalty, was certainly the excessive nature of the punishments, but an excess that was bound up with an irregularity even more than with an abuse of the power to punish.”[3]

            Moreover, it seems like the relation between Repression and Ideology is circular. They reproduce each other and secure each other and more than that they make the existence and the stability of the State possible by their cooperation. It seems like another Althusser’s argument fits that place very well to support my argument about the nature and function of these two Apparatuses. Althusser argues that “the state, which is the state of the ruling class, is neither public nor private; on the contrary; it is the precondition for any distinction between public and private… It is unimportant whether it is institutions in which they are realized are public or private. What matters is how they function.”[4] In my opinion, it is same for different types of apparatuses, too, whether it is ideological or repressive the apparatuses, they are both violent. However, we may make a kind of reverse statement about the apparatuses by saying that they are pre and after conditions for the system, for the dominant ideology. The state needs them to exist and continue to exist. I think, Althusser’s this statement also support my argument: “To my knowledge, no class can hold state power a long period without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the Ideological State Apparatus.”[5] And he continues, “Ruling ideology that ensures a ‘harmony’ between the Repressive State Apparatus and the Ideological State Apparatuses and between the different Ideological State Apparatus.”[6] We may link this argument with Delay’s argument that emphasizes “the language of genocide is used instrumentally by each ethnic group and by different parties. Genocidal violence became further institutionalized with the realization by military officers and politicians that it could be used to gain political advantage without international sanctions.”[7] It is clear that in this example, we become witness the collective work of Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses and how the dominant groups in the society manipulates them based on new social conditions.

            If I link these arguments with the prison industry complex and Davis’ arguments, first of all I think we need to talk about the impact of Ideological State Apparatuses such as school; media etc. which make people accept and internalize the practices of Repressive State Apparatuses, especially in the prisons and about the prisons and prisoners. As Althusser mentions that “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence,” [8] Davis also argues that “the prison is present in our lives and, at the same time, it is absent from our lives.”[9] The state and the dominant power make us to believe that we are aware of the conditions and the function of the prison system and also other types of repressive state apparatuses. Of course, this is an illusion! To fulfill this goal, the state uses countless types of apparatuses from ideological and repressive types. In my opinion, if we stick with Althusser's dualistic argument, the system uses ideological state apparatuses more, because it is more useful to hide the real motivations behind it. Also, it is everywhere in the society like air.

            When the state masses its hands, it gets more aggressive and uses more visual and physical violence. The extreme use of repressive state apparatuses does not mean to stop using the ideological apparatuses. Foucault supports my argument by saying that “one has only to point out so many precautions to realize that capital punishment remains fundamentally, even today, a spectacle that must actually by forbidden.”[10] In my opinion, we can link the fake progress and the switch between ideological and repression types of the state apparatus by the help of Foucault’s another argument: “Crime became less violent long before punishment became less severe.”[11] Also, similarly Davis argues that “the long-running HBO program Oz has managed to persuade many viewers that they know exactly what goes on in male maximum-security prisons.”[12] For these types of people, Ideological State Apparatuses are enough. However, if they do not internalize these delusional realities and decide to riot for change or abolish the prison than the Repressive State Apparatuses are ready for them. Probably, in the society even people who experience particular types of repression from the system can rationalize his or her violent experiences especially by the force of ideological state apparatuses. For instance, Davis mentions that “people wanted to believe that prisons would not only reduce crime, they would also provide jobs and stimulate economic development in out-of-the-way places.”[13] The Ideological State Apparatuses makes people rationalize the violence of the Repressive State Apparatuses even in the prisons. As Althusser argues, “the essential point is that on condition that we interpret the imaginary transposition and inversion of ideology we arrive at the conclusion that in ideology ‘men represent their real conditions of existence to themselves in an imaginary form.”[14] For the same reason, I believe that we have hard time to improve our imaginary to produce new and different types of resistance. As Davis suggests, we need to get rid of the dualistic solutions against the current system. Our minds have been forced to see the situation as prison industry complex or society with full of criminals. We need to break the rigid cycle of the systematic oppression of the state and its various apparatus. She emphasizes this clearly by saying that “the first step, then, would be to let go of the desire to discover one single alternative system of punishment that would occupy the same footprint as the prison system.”[15]

            Ultimately, if we link all of these arguments and try to produce something against the collective oppression of Repressive and Ideological State Apparatuses, in my opinion we may receive some intellectual help from Lugones. The way ideology reach every point of our lives and society, it seems like the resistance and critique of it should cover all sides of our lives and society, too, if we really want to create some changes. As she argues “this is clear when we understand that resistant sense cannot reside in “the individual” as the institutional backing that makes possible the appearance of individuality, is absent.”[16] It is clear that either Repression or Ideology of the state is not individual. For this reason, our resistance should be the same way to reach some meaningful and effective solutions. As Foucault emphasizes “the public execution is to be understood not only as a judicial, but also as a political ritual. It belongs, even in minor cases, to the ceremonies by which the power is manifested.”[17] People who resist against this dominant power and its various apparatuses, we need to find our own authentic and collective manifestations.

[1] Althusser, Louis. Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses. Appendix 2. Trans. Ben Brewster. Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971. Pg. 303.
[2] Althusser. “Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses.” Pg. 323.
[3] Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage Books, 1979. Pg. 78.
[4] Althusser. IISSA. Pg. 302, 303.
[5] Althusser. IISSA. Pg. 304.
[6] Althusser. IISSA. Pg. 306.
[7] Delay, Patricia. “The Masculinized Stat and the History of Genocide.” Pg. 77.
[8] Althusser. IISSA. Pg. 317.
[9] Davis, Y. Angela. Are Prisons Absolute? New York: Seven Stories Press. 2003. Pg. 15.
[10] Foucault. Discipline and Punish. Pg. 15.
[11] Foucault. DP. Pg. 76.
[12] Davis. Are Prisons Absolute? Pg. 18.
[13] Davis. APA? Pg. 15.
[14] Althusser. IISSA. Pg. 318.
[15] Davis. APA? Pg. 106.
[16] Lugones, Maria. Pilgrimages/Peregrinajes. New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers Inc. 2003. Pg. 218.
[17] Foucault. DP. Pg. 47.

Philosophical Hangouts!

Lugones frames the strategic occupation against the institutional, structural violence as “hanging out.” She writes, “I am looking for a spatiality that does not mystify territorial enclosures and purities of peoples, languages, traditions. As I think of such conditions, I am proposing the spatial practice of hanging out because it is a practice that is in transgression of territorial enclosures.” (Lugones, 220) In my opinion, we need to transgress the territorial enclosures not only by breaking the forced borders of the social structures physically, but also intellectually.

First, if we need to talk about physical challenges for a purpose as a philosophic and strategic movement, Lugones suggest hanging out as an option. By this way, we may also challenge “the given dichotomy.” (Lugones, 207) She claims that if we become street walkers as a part of tactical strategies to challenge oppressions, we may manage “to learn, to listen, to transmit information, to participate in communicative creations of intentionality, to gains social depth.” (Lugones, 209) According to her, being a streetwalker for this specific purpose, “theorizing understands and moves resistance to intermeshed oppressions.” (Lugones, 210) It seems like with a strategic motivation, hanging out action has a mutation and became an active resistance and philosophical movement. We may even say that by becoming a streetwalker for the purpose of “transgression of territorial enclosures” can save us from having Sartre’s famous arguments of bad faith. As Lugones claims, “Hanging out opens attention to transmutations of sense, borders of meaning, without the enclosures and exclusions that have characterized a politics of sameness… The occupation of space is defined by movement in and between hangouts where resistant sense was/is made in practice by active subjects.” (Lugones, 220) It sounds almost like a civil disobedience, but I do not want to label it by this way to not put limitations on its wider meanings and functions.

Moreover, if we link Lugones arguments with Davis, it is better to mention one more argument from her. At the end of the Streetwalker section, she argues that “The street walker theorist walks in illegitimate refusal to legitimate oppressive arrangements and logics. In tense negotiations, she is watchful of opportunities taken up in the devious interventions of the oppressed.” (Lugones, 221) I argue that we need to do these strategic hangouts intellectually, too. We need to be streetwalkers in the land of philosophy, sociology and history. Lugones’ this hangout argument reminded me one of the critiques of Davis about the lack of alternatives and lack of philosophical, sociological imagination for prison industry complex. She claims, “Ironically, even the anti-death penalty campaign tends to rely on the assumption that life imprisonment is the most rational alternative to capital punishment.” (Davis, 106) She criticized the dichotomy behind this mentality. She continues her argument by mentioning, “The first step then would be to let go of the desire to discover one single alternative system to punishment that would occupy the same footprint as the prison system.” (Davis, 106) It is possible to link this ironic position of the anti-death penalty campaign supporters and Davis’ critiques about problem of not being able to produce new options against prison with Lugones’ hangouts option. The intellectuals need to do more philosophical hangouts and (metaphorical) street walks to produce new options to break the either/or cycle in this violent system. If we can produce more intellectual streetwalkers in our society, we can produce more options to abolish prison and other forced fences.

actions and resistance at both places

Benjamin argues, “Today organized labour is, and apart from the state probably the only legal subject entitled to exercise violence.” (Benjamin, 239) As Walter Benjamin claims that violence cannot be practiced individually, all violence is structural and institutional. For the same reason, we may say that all resistance needs to contain some type of collective acts. Similarly, Lugones argues our “life is spatially mapped by power.” (Lugones, 8) It seems like to break down the asymmetric power relations between oppressors and oppressed, we need to act collectively, too. Even though sometimes the system uses the puppet leaders to make us blame and responsible for the oppression, the legitimate power and institutional violence are not practiced individually. Lugones continues her argument by saying “There is no “you” there except a person spatially and thus relationally conceived through your functionality in terms of power.” (Lugones, 9) It seems like we internalize the concept of individualism even as being oppressed. For people who live in the society and affected by the ideologies together, in the prison of Ideological State Apparatuses, the illusion of individual mind and act are a kind of abstraction of our existence and power. I reach to this conclusion by the help of these authors, but at the same time, one side of my mind still resists to keep the possibility of my own individual and intellectual authenticity.

At some point, even though as a person who prefer to think and act against the system individually without being an individualistic, I agree with Lugones. To shake the system from its roots, we need to accept that the society do not think and act individually, because all of our worlds are shaped by ideologies and there is not safe zone that we can escape from ideologies in our lives. I am struggling between the ideas of individual standpoints and collective resistance, but probably to avoid being a docile body and eliminate the conditions of having bad faith, we always need to come and go between individual and collective positions to not take one side for granted. By this dynamic existence, we may keep both positions of our existence fresh. As Lugones argues: “Noticing the tension from within logic of resistance enables one to acquire a multiple sensing, a multiple perceiving, and a multiple sociality.” (Lugones, 11) In other places, she claims that “When resistance is reduced to reaction, it is understood in the physical model and thus as contained in action. But resistance is not reaction but response-thoughtful, often complex, devious, insightful response, insightful into the very intricacies of the structure of what is being resisted.” (Lugones, 29) In my opinion, to get rid of the problem of reaction we may use my suggestion of negotiation of our existence between individual and collective positions. Both of these positions can be trigger for reactions to the social situations and if we balance our existence between both of the situations, each of them can be an antidote against reducing our resistance to reaction.

Sometimes, acting and rioting with a group or society as a subgroup of oppressed people can only produce reactions to the oppression. On the other hand, individual answers to the problem of collective, institutional repressions can be limited as only reactions, too. For these reasons, I argue that mediation of individual and collective acts can be our solution to produce more powerful resistance against systemic oppression.  It is hard to convince the reader to this argument, but as Althusser argues: “The essential point is that on condition that we interpret the imaginary transposition and inversion of ideology we arrive at the conclusion that in the ideology men represent their real conditions of existence to themselves in an imaginary form.” (Althusser, 318) In my opinion, these imaginary forms are neither only individual nor only collective forms. For this reason, switching our situations and producing actions and resistance at both places are necessary.